In response to a request from the US Capitol Police, members of the Texas A&M University Hazard Reduction & Recovery Center (HRRC) agreed to examine the current state of emergency preparedness for an air attack on the Capitol Complex. To accomplish this objective, the team reviewed documents, toured the Capitol Complex, and met with personnel from the Capitol Police, the Senate emergency preparedness organization, and the House emergency preparedness organization on 13 and 14 January, 2005. The HRRC team focused on the structure of the emergency response organization and its ability to detect and evaluate a threat, warn building occupants about the threat and recommend appropriate protective actions, and to implement those protective actions. In general, the HRRC team agreed with the assumptions made by US Capitol Police about the nature of the hazard (types of aircraft and behavior of pilots). Similarly, the HRRC team generally agreed with the assumptions made by US Capitol Police about the most likely target location and size of the impact area and, consequently, the feasibility of sheltering and evacuation as protective actions. Finally, the HRRC team examined assumptions about the time required to implement a building evacuation. Although some questions are raised about these assumptions later in this report, these are not based on a detailed analysis. In all cases, further examination of current planning assumptions requires additional data.

The emergency preparedness organization for the Capitol Complex has conducted a number of important analyses and has developed the basic elements of an effective plan for response to an air attack. The large number of targets of interest (TOIs), the limited amount of forewarning, and the devastating impact an aircraft impact could have on the Capitol Building and the Senate and House office buildings poses a threat that is unique in the field of emergency management. The high cost of disrupting the building occupants' normal activities or the travel patterns within the National Capitol Region are additional obstacles to resolving this problem. Briefly stated, increasing the amount of time to classify the TOI increases the accuracy of classification and, thus reduces the rate of false alarms and disruption to building occupants. However, increasing the amount of time to classify the TOI decreases the time available for initiating protective action and, potentially, increases the fatality rate from a successful attack. The principal risk management alternatives are to increase the size of the controlled airspace, increase TOI classification speed and accuracy, warn earlier, decrease building occupancy, increase evacuation capacity, protect the evacuation routes, or to bear the risk.

Source: Lindell, M. K., G.O. Rogers, C. S. Prater, W. G. Peacock, D. Bilbo and D. E. Wenger, 2005, Protective Response to Air Attack on the Capitol Hill Complex, Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center, Texas A&M University, for the U. S. Capitol Hill Police, Office of Emergency Management.Conducted in 2005, under contract to U. S. Army Corp of Engineers, Baltimore, Principal Investigator ($45K).